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Introduction 
The things that other people do not know about us are the things 
that make us human. Despite all of the benefits technology brings 
society, many digital users are left wondering how safe their personal 
information is when social media websites, search engines, Internet 
service providers, and other electronic communications service provid–
ers (“ECSPs”) collect and sell their data for commercial gain. 
With outdated legislation ill-suited to deal with modern 
technological advances, digital users have resorted to filing suit against 
ECSPs under a 1986 law, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(“ECPA”), which forms Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the “Wiretap Act”).1 Digital users allege that 
ECSPs are guilty of wiretapping when ECSPs “intercept”2 information 
 
1. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 
(2012). 
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2012) (providing criminal and civil sanctions for 
“any person who . . . intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or 
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, 
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contained in electronic communications sent via ECSPs’ platforms for 
the purpose of creating online-targeted advertisements.3 
Courts should not interpret the Wiretap Act to include conduct it 
was never intended to encompass.4 Leaving ECSPs amenable to suit 
under the Wiretap Act for conducting customary digital marketing 
practices stretches the text and purpose of the statute too far. Instead 
of applying the Wiretap Act to digital marketing practices, Congress 
should create a new federal data privacy law that governs the digital 
marketing industry as a whole. 
This Note explains that ECSPs are not guilty of wiretapping when 
they use a digital user’s information to create targeted advertisements 
because ECSPs are not “intercepting” an “electronic communication” 
under the Wiretap Act. This Note proposes that Congress adopt a new 
federal data privacy law that provides digital users the ability to retain 
control over how their personal information is shared. 
Part I analyzes the legislative history of the Wiretap Act and 
relevant court decisions interpreting its language. Part II looks to the 
text and structure of the Wiretap Act, highlighting the statute’s in–
applicability to digital marketing practices. Lastly, by comparing the 
European Union General Data Protection Regulation5 and the Cali–
fornia Consumer Privacy Act of 2018,6 Part III proposes attributes that 
new federal data privacy legislation should possess. 
 
oral, or electronic communication”); see also id. §§ 2511(4)–(5) (describing 
civil and criminal liability for a violation of subsection (1)). 
3. See, e.g., In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 
WL 5366963, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) (“Plaintiffs contend that 
Google violated the Wiretap Act in its operation of the Gmail system by 
intentionally intercepting the content of emails that were in transit to 
create profiles of Gmail users and to provide targeted advertisements.”). 
4. Ariel Dobkin, Information Fiduciaries in Practice: Data Privacy and User 
Expectations, 33 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 2, 5 (2018) (“Despite this 
admitted lack of transparency, the U.S. government does not adequately 
regulate service providers in any comprehensive way.”); Crystal Schreiber, 
Note, Google’s Targeted Advertising: An Analysis of Privacy Protections 
in an Internet Age, 24 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 269, 286 
(2014) (“The current U.S. federal laws provide too little protection for 
[I]nternet users. The pace at which technology and economic incentives 
have developed the marketplace has drastically exceeded the pace of 
protective legislation.”). 
5. Directive 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data and 
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
6. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100–
.199 (West 2018) [hereinafter CCPA]. 
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I. History of the Wiretap Act and Relevant Case Law 
The Wiretap Act was last amended at a time when the World Wide 
Web did not exist, let alone Google and Facebook.7 Not only were these 
tech giants unknown, but Americans also had a completely different 
relationship with technology because they did not spend most of their 
time online.8 As Americans changed the way they spent their time and 
money, businesses had to change the way they accommodated their 
clients. Accordingly, post cards were supplanted by emails and 
billboards were supplanted by online digital advertisements.9 
In the modern era, ECSPs commonly track digital users’ personal 
information.10 Some ECSPs, such as Google, obtain personal infor–
mation by scanning messages, while others, such as Embarq, obtain 
personal information by installing special technology on its servers that 
tracks a digital user’s online behavior. After gathering personal infor–
mation through unsettling digital marketing practices, ECSPs are in 
the driver’s seat. Google, for example, engages in keyword bidding, a 
lucrative process that involves running an auction with third-party 
 
7. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 
Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); see The 
Birth of the Web, Eur. Org. for Nuclear Research, https://home. 
 cern/topics/birth-web [https://perma.cc/W8UB-WKLZ] (last visited Oct. 8, 
2019). 
8. In 1996, the small percentage of Americans with Internet access spent an 
average of only 3.5 hours per week online. William J. Gibbs, 
Contemporary Research Methods and Data Analytics in the 
News Industry 1 (2015). Fast-forward to 2018, and the average 
American spent about 23.6 hours per week online. Jamie Condliffe, The 
Average American Spends 24 Hours a Week Online, MIT Tech. Rev. 
(Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/610045/ 
 the-average-american-spends-24-hours-a-week-online/ [https://perma.cc/ 
 MZ7G-PE68]. 
9. Forbes Communications Council, Does Print Still Have a Place in the 
Future of Advertising? 10 Experts Weigh In, Forbes (Mar. 2, 2018, 8:00 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbescommunicationscouncil/2018/03/ 
 02/does-print-still-have-a-place-in-the-future-of-advertising-10-experts-weigh-
in/ [https://perma.cc/GG46-6ZCF] (“Since the dawn of the [I]nternet, people 
have heralded the death of print media. It’s true that news has gone 
primarily online; most major media companies have made business model 
shifts in recent years to accommodate consumer preference for digital 
content.”). 
10. Laura Sydell, Smart Cookies Put Targeted Online Ads on the Rise, NPR 
(Oct. 5, 2010, 11:46 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. 
 php?storyId=130349989 [https://perma.cc/5953-LZWB]. 
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companies for ad placement.11 The highest bidding company has its 
advertisement appear on a digital user’s webpage.12 
To understand why the Wiretap Act does not apply to ECSPs’ 
digital marketing practices, it is important to examine the statute’s 
history and subsequent cases interpreting its language. 
A. History 
Although early American law proscribed eavesdropping,13 the crime 
was seldom enforced until the creation of telephones and telegraphs.14 
Correspondingly, in 1918, Congress enacted the first federal wiretap 
statute as a temporary measure to prevent the disclosure of government 
secrets during World War I.15 Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the 
Radio Act of 1927, a law that effectively proscribed intercepting and 
divulging private radio messages.16 
After Olmstead v. United States,17 Congress passed the Commun–
ications Act of 1934,18 expanding the Radio Act’s interception pro–
scription to include “radio” or “wire” communications. As the 
proscription broadened, states were left balancing their citizens’ Fourth 
Amendment rights against the preservation of wiretapping as a law 
enforcement tool.19 Consequently, some states established statutory 
systems authorizing law enforcement officials to wiretap or 
electronically eavesdrop on individuals, provided they first obtained a 
warrant or court order.20 
Against this backdrop, Congress enacted the Wiretap Act in 1968,21 
establishing procedures for law enforcement authorities to follow when 
 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Gina Stevens & Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., Order 
Code 98-326, Privacy: An Overview of Federal Statutes 
Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping 2 (2013). 
14. Id. 
15. Law of Oct. 29, 1918, ch. 197, 40 Stat. 1017 (1918). 
16. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). 
17. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). There, the Court held that no Fourth Amendment 
violation occurred when the government introduced at trial evidence it 
obtained through wiretapping. Id. at 466. 
18. Ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103–04 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 
(2012)). 
19. Stevens & Doyle, supra note 13, at 5. 
20. Id. 
21. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (June 11, 1968) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2012)). 
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conducting a wiretap. The Act was enacted “[t]o prevent crime and to 
insure the greater safety of the people.”22 
In 1986, Congress recast the Wiretap Act and granted law 
enforcement access to “electronic communications.”23 Congress’s goal 
was not only to “strike a balance between the interests of privacy and 
law enforcement,” but also to “avoid unnecessarily crippling infant 
industries in the fields of advanced communications technology.”24 
Fittingly, Congress added a liability exemption for ECSPs:25 the 
“ordinary course of business” exception exempts an ECSP from liability 
for interceptions that occur “in the ordinary course of its business.”26 
In creating the ordinary-course-of-business exception, Congress 
recognized that the “provider of electronic communications services 
may have to monitor a stream of transmissions in order to properly 
route, terminate, and otherwise manage the individual messages they 
contain.”27 The ordinary-course-of-business exception also represented 
Congress’s goal of striking a balance between protecting individuals’ 
privacy and “ensuring that the telecommunications industry was not 
hindered in the rapid development and deployment of the new services 
and technologies that continue to benefit and revolutionize society.”28 
The words “ordinary course of its business” were not defined in the 
ECPA. The judiciary has widely debated the definition and scope of 
the ordinary-course-of-business exception ever since. 
B. Relevant Case Law 
Following the enactment of the Wiretap Act, employees commonly 
sued employers for eavesdropping on their communications at work. 
Generally, employers would argue that the ordinary-course-of-business 
exception applied, thus exempting them from liability.29 From these 
 
22. Id. 
23. Stevens & Doyle, supra note 13, at 6 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2521 
(2012)). 
24. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 18–19 (1984); S. Rep. No. 99-541, 
at 5 (1986)). 
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i)–(ii) (2012). 
26. Interceptions that are conducted in the ordinary course of an ECSP’s 
business are excluded from the definition of “device.” See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(5) (2012) (defining an “electronic, mechanical, or other device” as 
“any device . . . other than . . . any telephone or telegraph instrument, 
equipment or facility, or any component thereof . . . being used by a 
provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary 
course of its business”). 
27. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 20 (1986). 
28. H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, at 13 (1994). 
29. See Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 983 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Arias v. Mut. Cent. Alarm Serv., Inc., 202 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 2000); 
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cases, a general rule emerged: if “the exemption is claimed as a practice 
in the ordinary course of business, the interception must be for a 
legitimate business reason, it must be routinely conducted, and at least 
in some circuits employees must be notified at [sic] that their 
conversations are being monitored.”30 
As the Wiretap Act began to evolve into data privacy legislation, 
ECSPs, like employers accused of wiretapping, relied on the ordinary-
course-of-business exception to protect themselves from liability. For 
example, in Hall v. EarthLink Network Inc.,31 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit was faced with an Internet service 
provider sued under the Wiretap Act for continuing to receive messages 
sent to the plaintiff’s email address after he terminated his email 
account.32 The court found that the ordinary-course-of-business 
exception applied because it was Earthlink’s “practice at the time to 
continue to receive and store emails on the server’s mail file after any 
account was cancelled,” and because Earthlink did not have “the ability 
to bounce e-mail[s] back to senders after the termination of an 
account.”33 
The Wiretap Act fully evolved into data privacy legislation, 
however, in Kirch v. Embarq Management Co.34 There, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit wrestled with an 
unprecedented fact pattern involving a third-party company that used 
digital users’ information to create online-targeted advertisements. 
The defendant, Embarq Management Company, was an Internet 
service provider.35 Embarq entered into an agreement with NebuAd, 
Inc., an online advertising company, “to conduct a technology test for 
directing online advertising to the users most likely to be interested in 
the ads.”36 The technology test involved NebuAd installing a system on 
Embarq’s network so that traffic passing through that system would be 
sent to NebuAd’s servers.37 NebuAd then used the information to track 
what websites Embarq users visited. After acquiring the information, 
 
Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Sanders v. Robert 
Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736, 741 (4th Cir. 1994); Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 
1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 1992). 
30. Stevens & Doyle, supra note 13, at 10. 
31. 396 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2005). 
32. Id. at 502. 
33. Id. at 505. 
34. 702 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2012). 
35. Id. at 1245. 
36. Id. at 1245–46. 
37. Id. at 1247. 
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NebuAd delivered online advertisements that would likely interest users 
who visited those websites.38 
Embarq users sued, alleging that during NebuAd’s technology test, 
Embarq intercepted their communications and routed them to 
NebuAd.39 The court held that Embarq was not liable “[b]ecause this 
access was only in the ordinary course of providing Internet services as 
an ISP.”40 Moreover, the court recognized that Embarq, an inter–
mediary between Embarq’s users and NebuAd, could not be liable 
under the Wiretap Act as an “aider and abettor.”41 
Relying on Hall, the court reasoned that just as Earthlink acquired 
Hall’s emails in its ordinary course of business, Embarq’s ordinary 
course of business as an Internet service provider necessitated that it 
have access to data transmitted over its Internet-providing equipment.42 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit never 
explicitly answered the question of whether NebuAd was liable under 
the Wiretap Act as a third-party advertising company for using the 
plaintiffs’ data to create online-targeted advertisements.43 This un–
answered question would soon generate litigation in Silicon Valley. 
In the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California, unnerving digital marketing practices have caused digital 
users to sue ECSPs under the Wiretap Act.44 Despite the clear factual 
differences between those cases and the appellate decisions in Kirch and 
Hall,45 some Northern District of California courts have nevertheless 
 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 1248 (quoting Kirch v. Embarq Mgmt., No. 10–2047–JAR, 2011 
WL 3651359, at *6 (D. Kan. Aug. 19, 2011)). 
40. Id. at 1246. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 1250–51. 
43. Id. at 1249 (“Like the district court, we need not address whether NebuAd 
intercepted any of the Kirches’ electronic communications.”). Following 
the trial court’s decision, the case between the Kirches and NebuAd was 
settled. See Valentine v. NebuAd, Inc., No. C 08-05113 TEH (LB), 2011 
WL 13244509, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2011). 
44. E.g., In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 
5423918 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013); In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy 
Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013). 
45. As one judge in the Northern District of California has observed: 
While Hall and Kirch present useful discussions of the “ordinary 
course of business” exceptions, the court ultimately finds that the 
factual differences preclude any meaningful application of those 
courts’ reasoning to this case. In Hall, there was no “interception” 
analogous to the alleged interception in this case—instead, the 
complained-about conduct was nothing more than the receipt of 
emails itself, which would be “ordinary” even under the narrowest 
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relied on those decisions when deciding whether the ordinary-course-of-
business exception applies to an ECSP’s digital marketing practices.46 
The scope of the exception as applied to digital marketing practices has 
resulted in diverging views among various judges in the district.47 
The following sections analyze both broad and narrow 
interpretations of the ordinary-course-of-business exception.48 The last 
interpretation is one that this Note defines as a “functional 
interpretation.” Lastly, this Note explains that these varying inter–
pretations create more problems than they solve by creating conflicting 
standards for compliance. Digital users’ privacy rights should not 
depend on which judge is assigned their case. 
1. Judge Koh: Narrow 
Under Judge Koh’s interpretation of the ordinary-course-of-
business exception, the exception applies only if an ECSP can prove 
that its digital marketing practice either facilitates, is incidental to, or 
is necessary to the transmission of the underlying communication. 
To illustrate, in In re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation,49 Judge Koh 
held that the ordinary-course-of-business exception did not apply to 
Google because Google’s digital marketing practice of scanning emails 
to create targeted advertisements was not “instrumental,” “incidental,” 
or “necessary” to Google sending an email.50 
 
view of the word. And while Kirch involved analysis of users’ web 
activity to aid in targeting advertising (similar to the allegations 
in the present case), the court’s dismissal of the Wiretap Act claim 
was based primarily on the fact that any unlawful interception 
was performed by a third party, rather than by the defendant. 
Notably, the Kirch court did not explain whether its decision 
would have been the same if the defendant itself had analyzed the 
web traffic to deliver targeted advertising, and the court never 
expressly held that targeted-ad-analysis was within the ordinary 
course of Embarq’s business as an [I]nternet service provider. 
Campbell v. Facebook Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 836, 843 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
46. See infra Parts I.B.1–2. 
47. See Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 843 (noting that “the Google court 
rejected a ‘narrow read’ of the exception that would be ‘limited to only 
action taken to deliver the electronic communication;’” whereas “the Gmail 
court cautioned that an overly broad interpretation of the exception would 
read the word ‘ordinary’ out of the statute”). 
48. See generally Kayla McKinnon, Comment, Nothing Personal, It’s Just 
Business: How Google’s Course of Business Operates at the Expense of 
Consumer Privacy, 33 J. Marshall J. Info. Tech. & Privacy L. 187, 
189–99 (2018) (discussing how the ordinary-course-of-business exception 
has both a narrow and a broad interpretation). 
49. No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013). 
50. Id. at *9, *11. 
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The court held that Kirch cut in favor of a narrow reading of the 
ordinary-course-of-business exception, and that Kirch stood only for the 
limited proposition that “interceptions incidental to the provision of the 
alleged interceptor’s [I]nternet service fall within the ‘ordinary course 
of business’ exception.”51 Relying on Hall, the court found that, unlike 
Earthlink—which presented testimony that it routinely continued to 
receive and store emails after an account was cancelled and that it did 
not have the ability to bounce-back emails to senders after an account 
was terminated—Google’s alleged interceptions were not a necessary 
part of its ability to provide email services.52 
In light of the statutory text’s plain meaning, as well as the overall 
statutory scheme and its legislative history, the court held that the 
ordinary-course-of-business exception is “narrow and designed only to 
protect electronic communication service providers against a finding of 
liability under the Wiretap Act where the interception facilitated or 
was incidental to provision of the electronic communication service at 
issue.”53 
Moreover, the court found that for a practice to fall within the 
ordinary-course-of-business exception, the alleged interception must 
have “some nexus” to the ECSP’s ultimate business; that is, its ability 
to provide the underlying service or good.54 Narrowly interpreting the 
ordinary-course-of-business exception remains the majority approach 
within the Northern District of California.55 
2. Judge Grewal: Broad 
Three months following In re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation, Judge 
Grewal rejected Judge Koh’s narrow interpretation of the ordinary-
course-of-business exception. In In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy 
Litigation,56 Judge Grewal held that the exception applied if ECSPs can 
prove that their digital marketing practice is furthering a legitimate 
business purpose and is not limited to acts that are necessary to process 
 
51. Id. at *8. 
52. Id. at *9. 
53. Id. at *11. 
54. Id. at *11. Additionally, key to the court’s finding was that Google 
violated its own internal policies. Id. at *11–12. 
55. See Matera v. Google Inc., No. 15-CV-04062-LHK, 2016 WL 8200619, at 
*14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016) (finding that the alleged practice requires 
“some nexus between the need to engage in the alleged interception and 
the [provider’s] ultimate business, that is, the ability to provide the 
underlying service or good”) (quoting In re Google Inc. Gmail, 2013 WL 
5423918, at *11 (alteration in original)). 
56. No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499, at *10–11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 
2013). 
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the underlying communication.57 Judge Grewal reasoned that because 
advertising is a legitimate business purpose, the ordinary-course-of-
business exception applied, exempting Google from liability under the 
Wiretap Act.58 
The plaintiffs in In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation alleged 
that Google’s practice of tracking a user’s personal identification 
information constituted a wiretap.59 The plaintiffs argued that the 
ordinary-course-of-business exception did not apply because it was not 
necessary for the delivery of Gmail that Google gather information 
about a person across all of Google’s platforms to create personalized 
Google search results and advertisements.60 
The court interpreted Kirch to apply the ordinary-course-of-
business exception “where the provider is furthering its ‘legitimate 
business purposes’—including advertising—and is not limited to only 
those acts that are technically necessary to processing email.”61 Judge 
Grewal further noted that other courts have “agreed that the ‘ordinary 
course of business’ exception is not limited to actions necessary to 
providing the electronic communication services” because “[n]othing in 
processing a closed account’s emails facilitates [or] was necessary” to 
sending emails.62 
Faced with the same text, history, and case law as Judge Koh, 
Judge Grewal stated that “[r]ather than narrowing the exemption to 
only the provision of electronic communications services itself, or some 
such narrower scope, Congress specifically chose the broader term 
‘business’ that covers more farranging [sic] activity.”63 The court 
reasoned that pairing “business” with “ordinary course” “suggest[s] an 
interest in protecting a provider’s customary and routine business 
practices.”64 Therefore, because targeted advertising was part of 
Google’s customary and routine business practice, the ordinary-course-
 
57. Id. at *11. 
58.  Id. 
59. Id. at *2–3. 
60. Id. at *10–11. 
61. Id. at *11. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at *10. 
64. Id.; see also Kirch v. Embarq Mgt., 10-2047-JAR, 2011 WL 3651359 at 
*9 n.42 (D. Kan. Aug. 19, 2011) (“The Court notes that [the ordinary-
course-of-business] defense also appears to have merit, as plaintiffs have 
admitted that Embarq conducted the NebuAd test to further legitimate 
business purposes and that behavioral advertising is a widespread business 
and is commonplace on the Internet.”). 
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of-business exception applied and the Wiretap Act claim against Google 
was dismissed.65 
3. Chief Judge Hamilton: Functional 
Chief Judge Hamilton adopted a functional approach in Campbell 
v. Facebook Inc.66 In Campbell, the chief judge recognized that, while 
Judge Grewal’s approach “emphasized the need to give meaning to the 
term ‘business,’ [Judge Koh’s approach] cautioned that an overly broad 
interpretation of the exception would read the word ‘ordinary’ out of 
the statute.”67 
Chief Judge Hamilton held, as Judge Koh did, that there must be 
“some nexus between the need to engage in the alleged interception and 
the subscriber’s ultimate business, that is, the ability to provide the 
underlying service or good.”68 She also held, as Judge Grewal did, that 
the exception must cover more than “necessary” activities.69 Chief 
Judge Hamilton also focused on the word “its” in the phrase “ordinary 
course of its business,” determining that a court must consider the 
details of an ECSP’s business “and must not rely on a generic, one-size-
fits-all approach that would apply the exception uniformly across all 
electronic communication service providers.”70 Under this functional 
approach, the fact that ECSPs generate revenue from a digital 
marketing practice, without more, does not mean that such conduct 
falls within the ordinary course of that ECSP’s business.71 
The plaintiffs in Campbell alleged that Facebook violated the 
Wiretap Act by using “likes” to compile user profiles and then using 
those profiles to deliver targeted advertising to its users.72 But because 
the court did not find “any facts alleged in the complaint or facts 
presented by Facebook that indicate a nexus between Facebook’s 
alleged scanning of users’ private messages for advertising purposes and 
 
65. In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., 2013 WL 6248499, at *11. 
66. 77 F. Supp. 3d 836 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
67. Id. at 843. 
68. Id. at 844 (quoting In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430-
LHK, 2013 WL 5423918, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013)). 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. (“An electronic communications service provider cannot simply adopt 
any revenue-generating practice and deem it ‘ordinary’ by its own 
subjective standard.”). 
72. Id. at 838–39. 
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its ability to provide its service,”73 the ordinary-course-of-business 
exception did not apply, and Facebook’s motion to dismiss was denied.74 
Two years after Campbell, Google was sued again under the 
Wiretap Act, this time by digital users who did not use Google’s 
services, but corresponded by email to individuals who did use Gmail 
services in Matera v. Google Inc.75 The plaintiffs alleged that, “due to 
the ubiquity of Gmail, [they] ha[ve] sent emails to and received emails 
from Gmail users, which Google allegedly ha[d] intercepted, scanned, 
and analyzed.”76 Google responded by moving to certify the following 
question to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: 
“Whether Google’s automated scanning of emails in providing Google 
services falls within the ‘ordinary course of its business’ exception to 
the Wiretap Act.”77 Ultimately, the court refused to certify the question 
for interlocutory appeal.78 
In Matera, Judge Koh relied on the narrow approach she used in 
In re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation to deny Google’s motion to dismiss 
because Google’s alleged interception of emails to provide targeted 
advertising, which in turn generated the revenue necessary for Google 
to provide Gmail, did not provide a “sufficient nexus” between the 
alleged interception and Gmail’s service.79 
The common issue with each approach to the ordinary-course-of-
business exception is the lack of clarity each interpretation provides. 
First, Judge Koh does not explain what practices are instrumental to 
sending a message.80 Also, it remains unclear what business practices 
provide a sufficient nexus between an ECSP’s need to engage in the 
alleged interception and the ECSP’s ability to provide its underlying 
service or good. Second, Judge Grewal does not explain how to decide 
whether a business practice is “legitimate.” Judge Grewal also reads 
“ordinary” out of the statute.81 Third, Chief Judge Hamilton leaves 
 
73. Id. at 844. 
74. Id. at 850. 
75. No. 15-CV-04062-LHK, 2016 WL 8200619 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016). 
76. Id. at *2. 
77. Id. at *15 (citation omitted). 
78. Id. at *16. 
79. Matera, 2016 WL 8200619, at *14. 
80. See In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 
WL 6248499, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (“For example, in delivering 
Gmail is it really ‘necessary’ [to] do more than just the comply with email 
protocols such as POP, IMAP and MAPI? What about spam-filtering or 
indexing? None of these activities have anything specifically to do with 
transmitting email.”). 
81. In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918, 
at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) (“The presence of the modifier ‘ordinary’ 
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courts with little to no guidance on how to decide whether a business 
practice is ordinary. For example, is a certain practice ordinary because 
ECSPs have been engaging in that practice for decades? Or, is a 
practice ordinary because an ECSP’s industry has been engaging in that 
practice for decades? 
As a result of the ambiguity surrounding the ordinary-course-of-
business exception, ECSPs are unaware of the protocol they need to 
follow to ensure they comply with federal law. More importantly, digital 
users have no way of knowing what information ECSPs collect from 
them, to whom ECSPs are selling their information, or how to opt out 
of an ECSP’s data collection—short of filing a federal lawsuit.82 
Although Google and Facebook relied on the ordinary-course-of-
business exception, the Wiretap Act’s text suggests that the Act does 
not apply to digital marketing practices at all. 
II. Statutory Text 
The Wiretap Act provides for both civil and criminal penalties 
against any person who “intentionally intercepts, endeavors to 
intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to 
intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication.”83 The Wiretap 
Act defines “intercept” as the “aural or other acquisition of the contents 
 
must mean that not everything Google does in the course of its business 
would fall within the exception.”); see also McKinnon, supra note 48, at 
210 (“The broad interpretation proposed by Judge Grewal in Privacy 
Policy Litig. prolongs a routine neglect of user privacy . . . . This 
interpretation swallows the Wiretap Act’s exception in whole, allowing 
for an ECSP to justify any conduct as part of the ordinary course of 
business by claiming that it serves an end goal or purpose.”). 
82. Even if digital users sue ECSPs under the Wiretap Act, there is a clear 
information asymmetry between digital users and ECSPs. Since ECSPs 
generally keep their digital marketing practices private, digital users may 
not meet pleading requirements under the Wiretap Act because they may 
not know the specific digital marketing practices ECSPs use. See, e.g., 
Smith v. Google LLC, No. 18-CV-06459-SVK, 2019 WL 542110, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2019) (finding plaintiff’s allegation insufficient to state 
a claim for relief under the Wiretap Act on the basis that “Google 
intercepted wire, oral, and electronic communications by invading the 
privacy of my phone calls, [I]nternet searches, and emails and are alleged 
to have redirected them unlawfully and/or improperly to unintended end 
users and/or endpoints.” (quoting Second Amended Complaint at 2, id. 
(No. 5:18CV06459))). 
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2012). Additionally, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that for there to be an interception 
in violation of the Wiretap Act, the communication must be acquired 
during transmission, not while the communication is in electronic storage. 
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any 
electronic, mechanical, or other device.”84 
By emphasizing important distinctions between an electronic 
communication and online behavior, and between device and software, 
this Note illustrates how the Wiretap Act’s text is inapplicable to 
digital marketing practices entirely. Additionally, this Note argues that 
the penalties imposed under the Wiretap Act may lead ECSPs to charge 
subscription fees, may not adequately deter ECSPs from violating the 
Wiretap Act, and may actually encourage ECSPs to spread a digital 
user’s information. 
A. Electronic Communication 
Under the Wiretap Act, “electronic communication” is defined as 
“any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or 
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, 
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that 
affects interstate or foreign commerce.”85 This definition is stretched too 
far when it includes a transfer that does not involve a human on the 
receiving end of the communication. 
The notion that a human has to be on the receiving end of an 
electronic communication is strongly supported by the statutory 
scheme. It is significant that the Wiretap Act excludes from the defin–
ition of electronic communication any communication made through a 
“tone-only paging device” or from a “tracking device” because both a 
two-tone pager and a tracking device involve a “transfer” between two 
devices that does not involve a human on its receiving end.86 Similarly, 
when a digital user’s online behavior is tracked by an ECSP for digital 
marketing purposes, the digital user is transferring information to a 
computer, not a human. 
The Wiretap Act generally “protects the parties to a commun–
ication against the unlawful interception, use, and disclosure of that 
communication by persons who are not parties to the communication.”87 
The Wiretap Act also allows an “aggrieved person” to move to suppress 
the contents of an unlawfully intercepted communication.88 An 
“aggrieved person” is any “person who was a party to any intercepted 
wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom the 
 
84. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2012). 
85. Id. § 2510(12). 
86. Id. § 2510(12)(B)–(C). 
87. United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 916 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2511–2512 (2012)) (emphasis in original). 
88. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)). 
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interception was directed.”89 The plain language of the Wiretap Act 
suggests that in order for there to be an “electronic communication,” 
there must be at least two “parties,” or individuals, involved. 
Despite the statutory scheme and the text of the Wiretap Act, 
courts have interpreted “electronic communication” to include a data 
transfer between a human and a computer. For example, in Kirch, the 
plaintiffs alleged that their Internet service provider aided a third-party 
advertising company in intercepting “Internet traffic.”90 The third-
party advertising company obtained three pieces of information from 
digital users: (1) the digital user’s webpage address, (2) the last URL 
she visited before the request, and (3) an encrypted advertising-network 
cookie.91 
Internet traffic is similar to the Call Data Content (“CDC”) at issue 
in United States v. Reed.92 In Reed, two men who were indicted for 
distributing and manufacturing Phencyclidine argued that the wiretap 
evidence that the government acquired in the course of its investigation 
should have been suppressed because the government failed to seal the 
CDC information during its wiretap.93 The district court ruled that 
since CDC was not a communication under the Wiretap Act, the 
evidence acquired by the government would not be suppressed.94 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding 
that CDC was not an electronic communication because “it [wa]s not 
communicated to or from the parties to the telephone call.”95 Rather, 
the CDC amounted to data that were incidental to the use of a 
communication device, and, therefore, it contained “no ‘content’ or 
information that the parties intended to communicate.”96 The same goes 
for the “Internet traffic” obtained by the third-party advertising 
company in Kirch because the alleged communication was data 
incidental to the digital user’s use of a computer and was not 
 
89. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C § 2510(11)) (emphasis in original). 
90. Kirch v. Embarq Mgmt., 702 F.3d 1245, 1247 (10th Cir. 2012). 
91. Id. at 1247–48. 
92. 575 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2009). CDC includes information regarding the 
origination, length, and time of a phone call. See id. at 914. 
93. Id. at 905, 914. The Wiretap Act’s sealing requirement states that “[t]he 
recording of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication 
under this subsection shall be done in such a way as will protect the 
recording from editing or other alterations. Immediately upon the 
expiration of the period of the order, . . . such recordings shall be made 
available to the judge issuing such order and sealed under his directions.” 
Id. at 915 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (2012)). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 916 (emphasis added). 
96. Id. 
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information the digital user intended to communicate to another 
human. 
At least one legal commentator has taken this argument a step 
further, suggesting that a human must be on the receiving end of an 
interception for that person to have a viable claim under the Wiretap 
Act.97 Under this view, Google’s email-scanning practices would not 
constitute an interception under the Wiretap Act because the practice 
is “completely automated and involve[s] no human review.”98 
In sum, the Wiretap Act should not apply unless at least two 
humans are involved in a communication, namely the person 
orchestrating the communication (the sender) and the person receiving 
the communication (the receiver). 
B. Device 
For an interception to occur under the Wiretap Act, the intercepted 
communication’s contents must be acquired “through the use of any 
electronic, mechanical, or other device” that “can be used to intercept 
a wire, oral, or electronic communication.”99 Since software, as opposed 
to a device, captures or redirects the contents of a communication, 
ECSPs are technically not “intercepting” an electronic communication 
under the Act.  
Instead of identifying the device that acquires the content of a 
communication,100 courts have mistakenly analyzed the device that 
 
97. Bruce E. Boyden, Can a Computer Intercept Your Email?, 34 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 669, 717 (2012) (“The Act has always required at least the 
prospect of human review, and not only because it was initially drafted in 
1968. Rather, it is because, as the drafters of the ECPA in 1986 
understood, computer monitoring is qualitatively different from human 
monitoring. It is the threat of human use of personal information that 
reduces privacy, and not simply that one’s information may be used in 
some way.”); see also Christopher Batiste-Boykin, In re Google Inc.: 
ECPA, Consent, and the Ordinary Course of Business in an Automated 
World, 20 Intell. Prop. L. Bull. 21, 36 (2015) (“The legislative history 
and the plain language of ECPA suggest that the statute prohibits only 
human interceptions of electronic communications.”). 
98. Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 
Consolidated Individual & Class Action Complaint at 4, In re Google Inc. 
Gmail Litig., No. 5:13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5366963 (N.D. Cal. June 
13, 2013), ECF No. 44. 
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4)–(5) (2012). 
100. Although the term “acquisition” is not defined in the statute, the Ninth 
Circuit has adopted its “ordinary meaning”: “the act of acquiring, or 
coming into possession of.” United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 
n.7 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit has elsewhere held that acquisition 
occurs “when the contents of a wire communication are captured or 
redirected in any way.” Noel v. Hall, 568 F.3d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
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stores the underlying communication. For example, in Kirch, the 
plaintiffs alleged that “the Internet traffic that passed through the UTA 
was sent to the NebuAd servers in its system.”101 The court’s analysis 
in Kirch does not turn on whether a server is a “device” because the 
server did not acquire the plaintiffs’ Internet communications; the 
Ultra-Transparent Technology (“UTA”) is the device because it 
captured and redirected the communications to a third-party’s server.102 
Like NebuAd’s use of the UTA system in Kirch, Google uses 
“various technologies to collect and store information, including 
cookies, pixel tags, local storage, such as browser web storage or 
application data caches, databases, and server logs.”103 Google also 
conceded “that incoming and outgoing emails [were] analyzed by 
automated software”104 before stopping that practice in 2017.105 
To understand why deep-packet inspection technology, cookies, 
pixel tags, browser web storage or application data caches, databases, 
and server logs (all intangible items) are excluded from the Wiretap 
Act, it is important to identify what Congress understood “device” to 
mean at the time the ECPA was adopted in 1986. 
The enactment of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984106 
(“CFAA”) supports the notion that Congress was aware of the 
distinction between “device” and “software,” but intentionally chose to 
exclude software from the Wiretap Act. The CFAA was enacted 
primarily to address the growing problem of computer hacking. 
 
101. Kirch v. Embarq Mgmt. Co., 702 F.3d 1245, 1247 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(emphasis added). 
102. An Ultra-Transparent Technology is a type of deep packet inspection 
technology. Handbook on Ethics and Marketing 397 (Alexander Nill 
ed. 2015); see also Andrea N. Person, Behavioral Advertisement 
Regulation: How the Negative Perception of Deep Packet Inspection 
Technology May Be Limiting the Online Experience, 62 Fed. Comm. L.J. 
435, 438 (2010) (“Deep Packet Inspection technology provides Internet 
service providers (ISPs) with the ability to collect all Internet 
communications made by a consumer. Depending on how the technology 
is deployed, it may ‘monitor[], analyze[], and potentially manipulate[] 
Internet traffic.’” (alteration in original)). 
103. Google Privacy Policy, Google, https://policies.google.com/privacy?hl= 
 en#infocollect [https://perma.cc/M8GD-2AUJ] (last updated Jan. 22, 2019). 
104. Samuel Gibbs, Gmail Does Scan All Emails, New Terms Clarify, The 
Guardian (Apr. 15, 2014, 8:24 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
 technology/2014/apr/15/gmail-scans-all-emails-new-google-terms-clarify 
[https://perma.cc/D3AL-MUXN].  
105. Kaya Yurieff, Google Still Lets Third-Party Apps Scan Your Gmail Data, 
CNN (Sept. 20, 2018, 5:32 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/09/20/ 
 technology/google-gmail-scanning/index.html [https://perma.cc/N4ZU-
3P2V]. 
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
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Congress recognized that by “intentionally trespassing into someone 
else’s computer files, the offender obtains at the very least information 
as to how to break into that computer system.”107 
The CFAA defines “computer” as “an electronic, magnetic, optical, 
electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device . . . but 
such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a 
portable hand held calculator, or other similar device.”108 Further, the 
CFAA states that “[n]o action may be brought under this subsection 
for the negligent design or manufacture of computer hardware, 
computer software, or firmware.”109 By distinguishing software and 
device in the CFAA in 1984, but excluding any mention of software in 
the ECPA in 1986, Congress understood device to exclude software. 
Similarly, the California legislature distinguished “Unique Iden–
tifier” from the definition of “device” in the California Consumer 
Privacy Act of 2018.110 The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 
defines “device” as “any physical object that is capable of connecting 
to the Internet, directly or indirectly, or to another device.”111 “Unique 
identifier,” however, is defined as “a persistent identifier that can be 
used to recognize a consumer . . . including, but not limited 
to . . . cookies, beacons, pixel tags, mobile ad identifiers, or similar 
technology.”112 
Because software is distinct from a device, ECSPs such as Facebook 
are not intentionally intercepting the contents of a communication 
when their automated software scans a digital user’s message. 
Therefore, a mere allegation that an ECSP “uses a software application 
called a ‘web crawler’ to scan any URLs that are contained in messages 
and to send server requests to that web page”113 does not prove that an 
interception occurred under the Wiretap Act because a tangible 
“device” is not acquiring the content of the electronic communication, 
software is.114  
C. Penalties 
Anyone who has been damaged by the interception or disclosure of 
their communications under the Wiretap Act is entitled to: “(1) any 
 
107. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 858 (6th Cir. 2012) (alteration in 
original) (quoting S. Rep. No. 99–432, at 9 (1986)). 
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) (2012). 
109. Id. § 1030(g) (emphasis added). 
110. CCPA §§ 1798.100–.199 (2018). 
111. CCPA § 1798.140(j). 
112. Id. § 1798.140(x). 
113. Campbell v. Facebook, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 836, 840 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  
114. See id. 
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preliminary, equitable, or declaratory relief that may be appropriate; 
(2) statutory and punitive damages; and (3) reasonable attorney’s fees.”  
As this Note explains below, providing injunctive relief to digital 
users under the Wiretap Act may lead ECSPs to begin charging 
subscription fees for their services, may not adequately deter ECSPs 
from violating a digital user’s privacy, and may incentivize ECSPs to 
spread a digital user’s information to be exempt from liability under 
the Wiretap Act.  
Providing injunctive relief to digital users under the Wiretap Act 
may result in ECSPs losing advertising revenue. To offset their losses, 
ECSPs may begin charging digital users a subscription fee to use their 
services.  
ECSPs such as Google receive their primary source of revenue from 
digital advertisements.115 Around eighty-six percent of Google’s total 
revenue in the second quarter of 2018 was derived from advertising 
revenue.116 Google generates its revenue and operates free-of-charge 
because it processes, collects, and sells its digital users’ data. But if 
enough digital users are granted injunctions that enjoin ECSPs such as 
Google from obtaining personal information from its users, then ECSPs 
may need to find other ways to compensate for their loss of 
advertisement revenue. 
One way Google could compensate for the loss of advertisement 
revenue is to begin charging all digital users an annual subscription fee 
to use its services.117 According to nmpiHome, this annual subscription 
fee could be forty-five dollars or more.118 The nmpiHome authors 
envision that the subscription would “include a full privacy agreement 
whereby no data about the user is collected. This could ease privacy 
concerns, but could also place consumers at a disadvantage as this data 
is currently used by Google to improve the user [experience].”119 
For some users, the social-media experience is more valuable than 
protecting their personal information, suggesting that some digital users 
 
115. For the second quarter ending on June 30, 2018, Google reported its 
advertisement revenue to be $28.087 billion, up 23.9% from $22.672 billion 
a year earlier. Zak Stambor, Google’s Ad Revenue Jumps 24% in Q2, 
Digital Com. 360 (July 23, 2018), https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/ 
 2018/07/23/googles-ad-revenue-jumps-24-in-q2/ [https://perma.cc/3VX9- 
 GBBF]. 
116. See Alphabet Announces Second Quarter 2018 Results, Google (July 23, 
2018), https://abc.xyz/investor/pdf/2018Q2_alphabet_earnings_release.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TX7Z-BSV]. 
117. What if You Had to Pay for Google?, NMPI Blog (June 13, 2017), 
https://nmpidigital.com/what-if-you-had-to-pay-for-google/?no_redirect 
[https://perma.cc/227J-7E2Q]. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
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may not value their privacy enough to pay a subscription fee for online 
services. For example, “[d]espite the parade of negative publicity 
surrounding the Cambridge Analytica revelations in mid-March 2018, 
Facebook added 70 million users between the end of 2017 and March 
31, 2018.”120 According to some economists, “[t]his implies the value 
users derive from the social network more than offsets the privacy 
concerns.”121 But without laws that expressly permit ECSPs to charge 
the digital users that seek injunctive relief or opt out of data collection 
a subscription fee, the other digital users who are unbothered by ECSPs 
collecting their personal information in exchange for free services may 
wind up paying for an ECSP’s service if enough other digital users 
object to sharing their personal information.122 
The Wiretap Act also requires subsequent offenders to be fined five 
hundred dollars.123 In contrast, the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation imposes on data controllers fines of at least four 
percent of annual global turnover or €20,000,000.124 Low fines, such as 
those provided in the Wiretap Act, may not encourage ECSPs to 
comply with federal law. 
 
120. Jay R. Corrigan et al., How Much is Social Media Worth? Estimating the 
Value of Facebook by Paying Users to Stop Using it, PLoS ONE (Dec. 
19, 2018), at 8, https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/ 
 journal.pone.0207101&type=printable [https://perma.cc/8XQY-3WNA]. 
Cambridge Analytica allegedly secretly harvested more than 50 million 
Facebook users’ personal information to build a system that could target 
US voters with personalized political advertisements based on their 
psychological profiles. Patrick Greenfield, The Cambridge Analytica Files: 
The Story So Far, The Guardian (Mar. 25, 2018, 7:53 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/26/the-cambridge-analytica-
files-the-story-so-far [https://perma.cc/GK3W-9ZJ4]. 
121. Corrigan et al., supra note 120. 
122. In a recent study, Pew Research analyzed Americans’ opinions on privacy- 
and information-sharing by asking individuals how comfortable they 
would be with free access to a social media site that used their activity 
on that site to deliver targeted advertisements. Lee Rainie & Maeve 
Duggan, Pew Res. Ctr., Privacy and Information Sharing 2–3 
(Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/ 
 9/2016/01/PI_2016.01.14_Privacy-and-Info-Sharing_FINAL.pdf [https:// 
 perma.cc/MT7G-FNJ5]. Specifically, one of the focus group participants 
stated, “[t]o be honest, I don’t really care. That is especially the case when 
I voluntarily use a service in return for giving up some information. For 
example, I use Gmail for free, but I know that Google will capture some 
information in return. I’m fine with that.” Id. at 6; see also United States 
v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“New 
technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense 
of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile.”). 
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(5)(a)(ii)(B) (2012). 
124. GDPR, supra note 5, at 83. 
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The logical outgrowth from ECSPs’ potential liability for 
wiretapping has been for ECSPs to outsource digital marketing 
practices to third parties.125 For instance, Google could avoid liability 
under the Wiretap Act as an “aider and abettor” if it acts like the 
defendant in Kirch and provides digital users’ information to a third 
party.126 But if protecting a digital user’s personal information is the 
ultimate goal, it seems counterintuitive that distributing a digital user’s 
personal information to more organizations exempts an ECSP from 
liability under the Wiretap Act. 
III. Proposal for Federal Legislation 
Digital users are not without hope.127 In 2016, the European Union 
enacted the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), a privacy 
law that has been coined as “one of the strongest and most 
comprehensive attempts globally to regulate the collection and use of 
personal data by both governments and the private sector.”128 Two 
years later, the State of California adopted the California Consumer 
Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), a privacy law “creating one of the most 
significant regulations overseeing the data-collection practices of 
technology companies in the United States.”129 In this Part, this Note 
proposes certain attributes that a new federal data privacy law should 
 
125. Yurieff, supra note 105 (“Gmail, which has over 1.4 billion users globally, 
lets third-party developers integrate services into its email platform, such 
as trip planners and custom relationship management systems.”). 
126. Kirch v. Embarq Mgmt. Co., 702 F.3d 1245, 1246 (10th Cir. 2012). 
127. Congress is currently contemplating what the United States’ first federal 
data-privacy law should look like in light of other data-privacy legislation, 
such as the CCPA and the GDPR. See Rhys Dipshan, House Hearing on 
Federal Privacy Law Takes Aim at GDPR, CCPA, Law.com: 
Legaltech News (Feb. 26, 2019, 2:24 PM), https://www.law.com/ 
 legaltechnews/2019/02/26/house-hearing-on-federal-privacy-law-takes-aim-
at-gdpr-ccpa/ [https://perma.cc/6H6K-JCPN] (“A U.S. House of Repre–
sentatives hearing on consumer privacy largely dismissed the EU’s 
General Data Protection Regulation and the California Consumer Privacy 
Act as the basis for future federal privacy legislation. But there was 
consensus that the status quo is unsustainable, with some arguing that 
the nationwide adoption of certain GDPR and CCPA principles is 
necessary in the U.S.”). 
128. The EU General Data Protection Regulation, Human Rights Watch 
(June 6, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/06/eu-
general-data-protection-regulation [https://perma.cc/JX2F-ZRNY]. 
129. Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Passes Sweeping Law to Protect Online 
Privacy, N.Y. Times (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/ 
 28/technology/california-online-privacy-law.html [https://perma.cc/ 
 5TM4-U2BH]. 
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possess based on the strengths and weaknesses of both the GDPR and 
the CCPA. 
A. European Union General Data Protection Regulation 
The GDPR provides “data subjects”130 in the European Union 
(“EU”) with several rights, including: the “right to be informed” 
(prescribing when information must be given to data subjects and what 
they must be informed of);131 the “right of access” (allowing data 
subjects to have full visibility of the data an organization holds about 
them);132 the “right to rectification” (granting data subjects the ability 
to have inaccurate personal data rectified, or completed if it is 
incomplete);133 the “right to erasure” (allowing individuals to request 
the deletion of their personal information);134 the “right to restrict 
processing” (providing data subjects with the ability to limit the way 
that an organization uses their data);135 the “right to data portability” 
(allowing subjects to receive their data processed on the basis of 
contract or consent in a structured, commonly used, and machine-
readable format and to transmit that data to another controller without 
hindrance);136 and the “right to object” (granting data subjects the 
ability to object to any type of processing of personal data).137 
The GDPR applies to all data controllers and data processors that 
hold EU citizens’ personal data.138 Accordingly, the GDPR applies 
specifically to organizations that may not have a presence in the EU, 
but still offer goods and services to, or monitor the behavior of, persons 
in the EU.139 Data subjects must “opt in” to data collection, meaning 
 
130. GDPR, supra note 5, at 33 (A data subject is “an identified or identifiable 
natural person.”). 
131. Id. at 11–12. 
132. Id. at 43. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 43–44. 
135. Id. at 44–45. 
136. Id. at 45. 
137. Id. at 45–46; see also Sarah Hospelhorn, California Consumer Privacy Act 
(CCPA) vs. GDPR, Varonis, https://www.varonis.com/blog/ccpa-vs-gdpr/ 
[https://perma.cc/84TQ-A6M4] (last updated Nov. 5, 2018). 
138. See generally GDPR, supra note 5. 
139. DataGuidance & Future of Privacy Forum, Comparing Privacy 
Laws: GDPR v. CCPA 8 (2018), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
 2018/11/GDPR_CCPA_Comparison-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL84- 
 AM54], available at Gabriela Zanfir-Fortuna & Michelle Bae, CCPA, Face 
to Face with the GDPR: An In Depth Comparative Analysis, Future of 
Privacy F. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://fpf.org/2018/11/28/fpf-and-
dataguidance-comparison-guide-gdpr-vs-ccpa/ [https://perma.cc/WE2R-
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that each website a data subject visits must obtain consent from the 
data subject prior to collecting the data subject’s data.140 
Individuals may seek damages for injuries caused by security-
measures violations or data breaches.141 Organizations in breach may be 
fined up to four percent of annual global turnover or €20,000,000.142 
B. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 
The CCPA provides consumers143 with four main rights: access, 
deletion, opt-out, and non-discrimination. The rights to “access”144 and 
“deletion”145 are similar to those guaranteed under the GDPR. Unlike 
the GDPR, however, the CCPA has both a “right to opt out” (allowing 
consumers to opt out from selling of their personal information) and a 
“right of non-discrimination” (protecting consumers from being 
discriminated against for exercising their privacy rights).146 
Only California businesses of a substantial size that collect 
consumer personal data are subject to the CCPA.147 Compared to how 
data subjects in the EU have a right to opt in and object to data 
collection, consumers in California can only opt out of the sale of 
personal data, not the collection of data or any other use that does not 
 
2P67]. Indeed, the GDPR commenced an enforcement notice against a 
Canadian data controller, AggregateIQ, in September 2018. Jonathan 
Chadwick, AggregateIQ Hit with First GDRP [sic] Enforcement Notice, 
Computer Bus. Rev. Online (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.cbronline 
 .com/news/gdpr-enforcement [https://perma.cc/V7SP-CX62]. 
140. GDPR, supra note 5, at 6 (“Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should 
not constitute consent.”). 
141. Id. at 80–82.  
142. Id. at 83. 
143. CCPA, supra note 6, § 1798.140(g) (“‘Consumer’ means a natural person 
who is a California resident . . . .”). 
144. Id. § 1798.110. 
145. Id. § 1798.105(a). 
146. Id. § 1798.125(a)(1)(A)–(C) (“A business shall not discriminate against a 
consumer because the consumer exercised any of the consumer’s rights 
under this title, including, but not limited to, by: (A) Denying goods or 
services to the consumer. (B) Charging different prices or rates for goods 
or services, including through the use of discounts or other benefits or 
imposing penalties. (C) Providing a different level or quality of goods or 
services to the consumer.”). This provision can be interpreted to mean 
that businesses cannot charge the specific consumers that opt out of data 
collection a subscription fee without charging all consumers a subscription fee. 
147. Id. § 1798.140(c). Only California businesses that earn $25,000,000 or 
more in revenue, or that annually buy, receive, sell or share personal 
information of 50,000 or more consumers, households or devices for 
commercial purposes, or that derive 50% or more of its annual revenue 
from selling consumer personal information is subject to the CCPA. Id. 
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fall under the definition of “selling.”148 Personal information obtained 
through automated means, such as the email-scanning practices at issue 
in In re Google, Inc. Gmail Litigation and In re Google, Inc. Privacy 
Policy Litigation, are regulated under the CCPA because “selling” 
encompasses disseminating a digital user’s information to a third 
party.149 
Although businesses cannot discriminate against consumers for 
their privacy choices, businesses may provide a consumer with 
“financial incentives,” including compensation, for allowing the business 
to collect, sell, or not delete a consumer’s personal information.150 The 
CCPA also requires that businesses include a “Do Not Sell My Personal 
Information” link on their home webpage.151 Further, there is a specific 
requirement that consumers must receive an explicit notice when a 
third party intends to sell personal information as part of a merger.152 
The GDPR specifies that organizations that do not have a physical 
presence in the EU may be subject to the GDPR.153 It is unclear whether 
the CCPA applies to a business established outside of California that 
collects or sells California consumers’ personal information while 
 
148. DataGuidance & Future of Privacy Forum, supra note 139, at 30. 
“Selling” includes “renting, releasing, disclosing, disseminating, making 
available, transferring, or otherwise communicating . . . personal 
information . . . for monetary or other valuable consideration.” CCPA, 
supra note 6, § 1798.140(t)(1). 
149. See CCPA, supra note 6, § 1798.140(t)(1); see also id. § 1798.140(q) 
(“‘Processing’ means any operation or set of operations that are performed 
on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated 
means.” (emphasis added)). 
150. Id. § 1798.125(b)(1). 
151. Id. § 1798.135(a)(1). 
152. Id. § 1798.130(a)(2). 
153. GDPR, supra note 5, at 22–23. Under the GDPR, a company is subject 
to the GDPR if it processes personal data of an individual residing in the 
EU when the data are accessed. Id. 
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conducting business.154 Businesses in breach of the CCPA can be fined 
up to $7,500 per violation.155 
The state attorney general has the exclusive power to enforce the 
CCPA, except in data-breach cases where the attorney general declines 
to prosecute within thirty days of being notified of a consumer’s intent 
to bring suit.156 
C. Analysis 
Although both the GDPR and the CCPA “aim to guarantee strong 
protection for individuals regarding their personal data and apply to 
businesses that collect, use, or share consumer data,”157 they both pose 
various issues. The GDPR’s opt-in requirement, for example, relies on 
the premise that digital users actually read the consent and disclosures 
webpage before waiving their privacy rights by clicking an “accept” 
button.158 Adhesion contracts on webpages may not be the best way to 
 
154. DataGuidance & Future of Privacy Forum, supra note 139, at 8. 
In general, when a statute provides for some extraterritorial application, 
the presumption against extraterritoriality operates to limit that provision 
to its terms. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455–56 
(2007) (citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993)). This 
Pennoyer-esque presumption may be outdated, as illustrated by a recent 
decision issued by the United States Supreme Court. In South Dakota v. 
Wayfair, Inc., the Court held that online retailers without a physical 
presence in a state—but with sufficient contacts in that state—could be 
required to collect use taxes from its in-state customers. 138 S. Ct. 2080, 
2099 (2018). The Court reasoned that “[b]etween targeted advertising and 
instant access to most consumers via any [I]nternet-enabled device, ‘a 
business may be present in a State in a meaningful way without’ that 
presence ‘being physical in the traditional sense of the term.’” Id. at 2095 
(quoting Direct Marketing Assn. v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015)). 
Wayfair suggests that businesses that collect data of California residents 
online may be subject to the CCPA, even if they do not have a 
“traditional” physical presence in California. Should an out-of-state 
business be required to obey another state’s tax and data privacy laws? 
See Jonathan L. Entin, Another Superseded Quill: The End of the 
Physical-Presence Rule for Requiring Out-of-State Businesses to Collect 
Use Taxes, 36 J. Tax’n Inv. 15, 23 (2018) (“The Supreme Court’s 
Wayfair decision leaves many uncertainties. . . . Most of those 
uncertainties relate to how the Court will define the scope of state 
authority to compel out-of-state-business to collect use taxes . . . .”). 
155. CCPA, supra note 6, § 1798.155(b). 
156. Id. 
157. Zanfir-Fortuna & Bae, supra note 139. 
158. But cf. 15 Unexpected Consequences of GDPR, Forbes (Aug. 15, 2018, 
9:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/08/15/ 
 15-unexpected-consequences-of-gdpr/#54a41c594ad7 [https://perma.cc/ 
 K3D8-SG56] (“Another unintended impact is ‘check the box’ fatigue 
where opt-in consent language is presented so frequently on websites and 
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obtain informed consent. A digital user’s online experience is hindered 
when they are persistently being asked for consent every time they visit 
a new website. Although the CCPA’s opt-out requirement allows for a 
less intrusive user experience, the requirement only applies to the selling 
of data, not the collection of it. As a result, digital users are not given 
adequate control over how their personal information is used under the 
CCPA. 
The CCPA’s $7,500 per violation fine may also be minuscule in 
comparison to the GDPR’s potential fine. Along with weak penalties 
that may not deter businesses from breaching a digital user’s privacy, 
the CCPA applies only to very specific businesses, which may result in 
businesses restructuring themselves in a way that exempts them from 
liability under the CCPA. For example, a company may structure its 
finances so that it does not generate $25,000,000 in revenue. A company 
may also outsource data-mining practices to international third-party 
companies that may not be subjected to the CCPA.159 Lastly, neither 
the CCPA nor the GDPR explicitly permit businesses to charge an 
additional fee only to consumers who want to use a business’s products 
and services but who do not want their information monetized. As a 
result, businesses subject to the CCPA and the GDPR may have no 
choice but to begin charging subscription fees to all digital users because 
some value their privacy more than others. 
D. Proposal 
New legislation should be focused on providing digital users the 
ability to retain control over how their personal information is shared. 
American digital users should be granted the right to access their 
personal information that was collected, processed, or sold by an 
organization. Organizations should be given at least ten business days 
to comply with an American digital user’s request for personal 
information by sending those users a hard copy of the personal 
information via first-class mail or sending the American digital user a 
PDF by email. 
American digital users should also be granted the right to delete 
personal data that organizations have collected from them. Upon a 
request to an organization that their data be deleted, American digital 
users should receive a confirmation via first-class mail or email that 
their data has been deleted. 
Increased privacy may come at a cost. Just as American digital 
users should have the ability to opt out of the collecting, processing, 
and selling of their personal information, ECSPs should be permitted 
to charge a subscription fee to those users. Such a system would allow 
 
apps that consumers don’t read the consents and just check the box, 
waiving their privacy rights.”). 
159. See DataGuidance & Future of Privacy Forum, supra note 139, at 
8–9. 
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American digital users who are comfortable exchanging their data in 
return for a free service to continue to do so, while still protecting users 
who place a higher premium on their personal information. 
Instead of cluttering webpages with adhesion contracts or “Do Not 
Sell My Personal Information” buttons, Congress should create a federal 
data privacy website where American digital users register an account 
and set their default privacy preferences.160 After registering for an 
account, those users should be given a list of all websites that collect, 
process, or sell information about them. After reviewing that list, users 
should be able to opt out of the data-collection practices of some or all 
of the sites. Information gathered from that central webpage about each 
American digital user’s privacy preferences should then be sent to the 
ECSPs that are subject to the new federal legislation to ensure they 
comply with each user’s preferences. 
American digital users who are not comfortable providing 
information to the federal data privacy website should still be given the 
chance to opt out of the collection, process, and sale of their personal 
information directly from the ECSP. Accordingly, although there does 
not need to be a “Do Not Sell My Personal Information” button on the 
top of every homepage, ECSPs subject to the new federal legislation 
should still provide American digital users the ability to opt out in a 
privacy settings tab on their main webpage. 
The new federal legislation should be implemented by a federal 
agency. An existing agency, such as the Federal Trade Commission, 
could enforce the legislation.161 The Federal Trade Commission 
currently “oversees consumer protection and enforces antitrust laws, 
but has limited ability to police data privacy.”162 The Federal Trade 
Commission should have the ability to enforce the new data privacy 
 
160. Since the webpage would be collecting information of American digital 
users, the national website should be exempt from the new federal 
legislation. See Consumer Data Protection Act, SIL18B29, § 6 (a)(1)(A) 
115th Cong. (2018) (proposing that the Federal Trade Commission 
implement and maintain a ‘‘Do Not Track’’ data sharing opt out website 
that allows consumers to opt out of data sharing, view their opt out 
status, and change their opt out status). 
161. An existing agency such as the Federal Trade Commission can be tasked 
with enforcement. Alternatively, a new agency, consisting of professionals 
who are familiar with data analytics, technology, and software 
development, may be created to enforce the new federal data privacy 
legislation. 
162. Daniel R. Stoller & Ben Brody, New FTC Powers Weighed in Senate Data 
Privacy Hearing, Bloomberg Law (Feb. 27, 2019, 2:28 PM), https://www. 
 bloomberglaw.com/document/XC7HDUR8000000?bna_news_filter=privacy
-and-data-security&jcsearch=BNA%2520000001692f6cd275a76bbf7e443f0002 
 #jcite [https://perma.cc/KTC8-L357]. 
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legislation in conjunction with the states’ attorneys general,163 similar 
to its enforcement powers under the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act.164 
Although the new federal legislation should be comprehensive and 
detailed, technology progresses at an exponentially faster rate than the 
law. Congress cannot possibly foresee every potential way data might 
be processed or collected in the future. Accordingly, the new legislation 
should provide the enforcing agency with limited rulemaking authority, 
specifically in the area of determining what actions constitute 
“collecting” or “processing” an American consumer’s data. 
The enforcing agency should be tasked with ensuring organizations 
comply with the new federal legislation. To do so, it should have the 
power to conduct investigations, manage the new federal data privacy 
website, offer compliance advice to organizations (perhaps via an 
anonymous hotline),165 and outline compliance protocols in an annually 
updated manual.166 The new federal legislation should also require 
 
163. See id.  
164. 15 U.S.C. § 6505 (2012). 
165. American organizations should be given the necessary tools to comply 
with the new federal legislation. Based on a Crowd Research Report, EU 
organizations’ main GDPR-compliance challenges are “a lack of expert 
staff (cited by 43 percent), lack of budget (40 percent), and a limited 
understanding of GDPR regulations (31 percent).” Bob Violino, GDPR 
Compliance: For Many Companies, it Might be Time to Panic, ZDNet 
(May 24, 2018, 9:31 AM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/gdpr-compliance-
for-many-companies-it-might-be-time-to-panic/ [https://perma.cc/NKK8-
X39E]. 
166. Compliance with federal law may be easier for large companies with 
divisions dedicated to compliance. For mid-size and small companies who 
do not have adequate resources, the agency can serve as a resource to 
ensure that they can comply with federal law and stay in business. See 
Ivana Kottasová, These Companies are Getting Killed by GDPR, CNN 
(May 11, 2018, 6:39 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/11/technology/ 
 gdpr-tech-companies-losers/index.html [https://perma.cc/4LUM-N7VE] 
(“The cost of complying with the [GDPR] has already forced an online 
game producer, a small social network and a mobile marketing firm to 
close key businesses or shut down entirely. . . . Complying with the new 
regulations isn’t cheap, and experts say the world’s biggest companies are 
spending tens of millions of dollars to prepare. Smaller companies that do 
not have the same resources are struggling.”); see also Lisa V. Zivkovic, 
The Alignment Between the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and 
the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation: Reform Needs 
to Protect the Data Subject, 28 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 189, 
210–11 (2018) (“The discretion left to the supervisory authorities to ensure 
compliance is arguably substantial. In other words, given the potential for 
liability, the cost to comply, and the uncertainty regarding requirements 
for actual compliance, American multinational companies are arguably 
more likely to sever their business models and localize their data rather 
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organizations to submit to the enforcing agency semi-annual reports 
outlining what data-collection practices the company is using and where 
each American digital user’s data are going. 
This proposed federal legislation should preempt state data privacy 
laws.167 Under the principles of federalism, the new federal legislation 
should trump state privacy laws such as the CCPA.168 The new federal 
legislation also should not use restrictive language to define who is 
subject to the statute because companies who do not meet a revenue 
threshold, for instance, are still capable of invading a digital user’s 
privacy. Instead of following the CCPA’s definition of “business,”169 the 
new federal legislation should refer to organizations in more general 
terms, such as “data controllers” and “data processors.”170 The new 
federal legislation should have a provision explicitly stating that the 
statute applies to data processors and data controllers who are not 
physically located in the United States but collect information from 
American digital users. As a result, organizations subject to the new 
federal legislation would be discouraged from outsourcing their data-
mining practices abroad to foreign companies. 
Penalties under the new federal legislation should deter 
organizations from breaching a digital user’s privacy. The federal 
legislation should follow the GDPR and require breaching organizations 
to pay either four percent of annual turnover or $20,000,000 for an 
offense. American digital users should be notified directly from the 
 
than risk not only losing business in the EU but also suffering the 
important economic penalties for non-compliance.”). 
167. As noted by the Federal Trade Commission’s former Chairman, Jon 
Leibowitz, “‘[y]ou don’t want a cacophony or a crazy quilt patchwork of 
[fifty] different state laws . . . [i]t’ll make consumers numb to 
notifications’ about companies’ data privacy policies.” Gopal Ratnam, 
Senate Commerce Chairman Eyes Data Privacy Bill This Year, Roll 
Call (Feb. 28, 2019, 1:43 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/ 
 senate-commerce-chairman-eyes-data-privacy-bill-year [https://perma.cc/ 
 XRP6-TCDT]. 
168. See McCulloch v. The State of Maryland et al., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
360–61 (1819) (stating that “the States are prohibited from passing any 
acts which shall be repugnant to a law of the United States.”). A 
comprehensive federal data privacy law may also avoid the significant 
constitutional concerns inherent in a state-by-state patchwork approach 
to data privacy. See Mallory Ursul, The States’ Role in Data Privacy: 
California Consumer Privacy Act Versus Dormant Commerce Clause, 52 
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 577, 602 (2019) (stating that “if circumstances change 
where more states begin to regulate data privacy and create regulatory 
conflict, the CCPA may be held unconstitutional under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.”). 
169. CCPA, supra note 6, § 1798.140(c)(1).  
170. See GDPR, supra note 5, at 33 (broadly defining both “controller” and 
“processor”). 
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enforcing agency if their personal information was involved in a data 
breach. The enforcing agency and the states’ attorneys general should 
have the exclusive authority to prosecute organizations who violate the 
new federal legislation. If either decline to prosecute an organization, 
American digital users affected by a serious breach should be permitted 
to file a grievance with the enforcing agency and exhaust all 
administrative remedies before filing a civil suit against an ECSP in 
federal court. 
Conclusion 
Federal data privacy legislation has appeared on the horizon and 
will likely be formally introduced to Congress in the coming year.171 For 
example, Senator Ron Wyden’s bill, the Consumer Data Protection Act 
of 2018,172 creates a set of minimum cybersecurity and privacy 
standards, a national Do Not Track system that allows consumers to 
stop third-party data companies from tracking them on the web, and 
establishes a consumer’s right to know what personal data is being 
collected about her and how it is being used.173 Senator Brian Schatz’s 
bill, the Data Care Act of 2018,174 proposes a “duty to care” regulatory 
approach that would require tech companies to provide a “reasonable” 
level of security around personal data.175 
Until a federal data privacy law is passed by Congress, however, 
digital users are left with little to no control over how their personal 
information is used by ECSPs under existing law.176 The Wiretap Act’s 
 
171. Mark Sullivan, Inside the Upcoming Fight over a New Federal Privacy 
Law, Fast Company (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/ 
 90288030/inside-the-upcoming-fight-over-a-new-federal-privacy-law [https:// 
 perma.cc/YG2E-FZVT] (“There may be as many as six major bills 
circulating in the Senate by mid-2019. And with the new Democratically 
controlled House, such a bill may have a good chance of passage.”); see 
also Ratnam, supra note 167 (“Senate Commerce, Science and Trans–
portation Chairman Roger Wicker is aiming to have a federal data privacy 
bill written and passed by Congress this year as technology companies, 
privacy advocates and civil rights groups press lawmakers to act decisively 
to avoid a patchwork of state legislation.”). 
172. Consumer Data Protection Act, S. 2188, 115th Cong. § 1 (2018). 
173. Sullivan, supra note 171. 
174. Data Care Act, S. 3744, 115th Cong. § 1 (2018). 
175. Sullivan, supra note 171. 
176. Digital users are, however, suing ECSPs under the Wiretap Act in 
unprecedented contexts. See, e.g., Satchell v. Sonic Notify, Inc., 234 F. 
Supp. 3d 996, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (alleging that an app provider used 
beacon technology to turn on a user’s smartphone microphone and record 
the user’s communications in order to track how the user interacted with 
marketing and advertisements); Rackemann v. LISNR, Inc., No. 117-CV-
00624-TWP-MJD, 2017 WL 4340349 at *1–2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2017) 
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“conflicting privacy standards that create uncertainty and confusion for 
law enforcement, for the business community, and for American 
consumers”177 will inevitably worsen as technology continues to 
advance178 and tech giants such as Amazon enter the digital marketing 
industry.179 
It is time that Americans receive adequate protection under a law 
that provides them the ability to retain control over how their personal 
information is shared. That time is now. 
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(same); In re Lenovo Adware Litig., No. 15-MD-02624-RMW, 2016 WL 
6277245 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2016) (alleging that a manufacturer 
sold computers with pre-installed adware programs that collected the 
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anyone around the world while making it possible for others to reach us, 
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home and which also allow others to track our movements, to home 
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enter the home, but allow us to turn lights on and off from remote 
locations, we live in a world increasingly interconnected by technology.”). 
179. Julie Creswell, Amazon Sets its Sights on $88b Online Ad Market, Gulf 
News (Sept. 4, 2018, 2:56 PM), https://gulfnews.com/technology/media/ 
 amazon-sets-its-sights-on-88b-online-ad-market-1.2274472 [https://perma 
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